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PROPERTY AS LEGAL KNOWLEDGE:
MEANS AND ENDS
Annelise Riles
Cornell University
This article takes anthropologists’ renewed interest in property theory as an opportunity
to consider legal theory-making as an ethnographic subject in its own right. My focus
is on one particular construct – the instrument, or relation of means to ends, that animates both legal and anthropological theories about property. An analysis of the workings of this construct leads to the conclusion that rather than critique the ends of legal
knowledge, the anthropology of property should devote itself to articulating its own
means.

Law is a means, a specific social means, not an end (Kelsen 1941: 80).
Many lawyers and law professors view law as an instrument for controlling society and
directing social change, but most anthropologists are concerned with law as a reflection
of a particular social order (Moore 1978: 244).

The recent revival of interest in property among anthropologists has generated new opportunities for anthropological dialogue with legal theory (Hann
1998; Pottage & Mundy 2004). Anthropologists now describe the effects of
legal reforms such as privatization (Verdery 1996); they analyze legal doctrines
such as copyright (Haraway 1997); they summarize jurisprudential debates
(Mundy 2004) and they make suggestions concerning the ways in which legal
doctrines should be interpreted or applied, as, for example, where indigenous
people’s property rights are concerned (Brown 2003; cf. Moore 2001). If property is a subject which causes anthropologists to look to law, American legal
theorists of property increasingly look to anthropology in turn, as the innovation of much of the new property scholarship consists in the incorporation
of insights from anthropology, socio-biology, and cultural studies (as well as
economics, social psychology, political science, and other disciplines)
(Ellickson 1991; Rose 1994).
While the result is that anthropologists and legal scholars now regularly find
themselves sitting across from one another at academic conferences and citing
one another in print, anthropologists encountering new legal theories of property might also be perplexed to discover the ways in which concepts from
functionalist social science, symbolic anthropology, and even performativity
theory are put to use in these writings. The problem is not simply that outmoded anthropological theories are now finding their way into the law; it is
© Royal Anthropological Institute 2004.
J. Roy. anthrop. Inst. (N.S.) 10, 775-795
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rather that we now have two very different conceptions of the means and
ends of knowledge.
Marilyn Strathern has noted that for anthropologists, property relations are
both a kind of found object encountered in the field and an analytical category. Strathern describes her own interest in an American law case concerning rights of ownership of human embryos, for example, as follows:
The … embryos were in dispute precisely as the product of a relationship between former
conjugal partners. An abstract understanding of property as a set of relations is … explored
[in the anthropological account] through concrete instances where relations are presented
twice over, as at once the (invisible) conceptual precondition of there being any claims
or rights in the first place and as the (visible) social grounding of the particular dispute
at issue (1999: 140).

Strathern describes the anthropologist’s property construct here in terms that
she has used to describe other anthropological artefacts – as taking the form
of a homological relationship between analysis and description, theory and
data (Strathern 1995). Property, as an anthropological artefact, exemplifies this
form.
But property is unique among anthropological artefacts in one particular
way: it is also always an implicit or explicit marker of a disciplinary relationship between anthropology and law. Anthropologists’ usage of the language of
ownership relations, as opposed to property relations, is at least in part a purposeful attempt to define an anthropological vocabulary distinct from the legal
vocabulary, for example. And these relations of ownership usually emerge in
anthropological accounts as targets of critique, as in the case of anthropologists who analyse property relations by exploring the political relations that
are enabled and represented by property (Moore 2001). As Katherine Verdery
puts it, ‘The first question is: through what sorts of social struggles are actors
striving to carve individual ownership rights … and in whose interests (if
anyone’s) is it to clarify these, reducing ambiguities and rendering rights more
exclusive?’ (1998: 161).
In other words, anthropologists seek to achieve critical distance from property relations by pointing to their instrumental uses. By doing so, they also
achieve critical distance from lawyers: what is taken as lawyers’ narrow conception of ownership relations and unexamined commitment to neo-liberal
property regimes serves as a kind of ‘straw man’ in anthropological accounts
(cf. Strathern 1981), that is, a target of oppositional analysis, a foil for anthropologists’ own broader, more contextual analyses. Property is a special anthropological artefact, in other words, because it serves as a stand-in for the
relationship of law to anthropology as anthropologists wish to see it. Consider, for example, Malinowski’s foundational distrust of legal knowledge:
There is nothing extraordinary in the professional lawyer’s exclusive interest in cases of
breach, retribution, codified rules and all that is legal only in the narrowest technical
sense. A case may be righteous, just and deserving, yet no lawyer will touch it if it does
not rest on sufficient evidence; or if it would arouse some well-known prejudice in a
representative jury; or is technically unsound for any formal reason. No lawyer, however
moral and upright, will refuse to take a case which, however sociologically unsound and
ethically reprehensible, has really all the strength of law behind it. The practical lawyer’s
business is to take part in the practical administration of law (Malinowski 1972 [1934]:
lxvii).
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In this passage, Malinowski defines an ethically empowered disciplinary place
for anthropology, as critic of the law. Others have followed this line of argument to delineate a disciplinary difference between anthropology and law in
terms of a difference between two forms of knowledge – lawyers’ narrow
knowledge versus anthropologists’ broader conception of property, or, in Sally
Falk Moore’s acute observation quoted as the second epigraph to this article,
the difference between knowledge as an ‘instrument’ and knowledge as a
‘reflection of a particular social order’.
If anthropological analyses have traditionally sought to broaden the scope
of recognized ownership forms beyond the lawyer’s narrow understanding of
property, however, the renewed significance of property as an ethnographic
subject results from the fact that people in many regions of the world have
come to identify the products of their creative work in precisely the neoliberal, lawyerly language of property in a bid to endow these creations with
visibility under the law (e.g. Kalinoe 1999; Leach 2003; Maurer 2003). This
has come as something of a shock, not least because this property discourse
has created new problems for, and focused new attention on, the means by
which ethnographers attain their ends. Whether it is informants who are
asserting ownership rights in anthropological knowledge, or universities and
funding authorities demanding proof that informants have consented to the
taking of ‘their’ knowledge, anthropologists’ efforts to make means of others’
ends often find themselves blocked by others’ assertions of ownership. At the
same time, some anthropologists have also found in this condition new opportunities, as native title disputes and disputes over intellectual property rights
provide the premise for recasting ethnographic knowledge as a tool for expert
intervention in legal contests and debates.What is missing from many of these
projects, however, is a serious ethnographic engagement with lawyers’ own
knowledge practices. If the project of the anthropology of law has been to
oppose legal knowledge, and most recently has become also to participate in
it, anthropologists have on the whole been slow to make legal knowledge
itself an object of ethnographic study.1
One goal of this article is to persuade anthropologists with an interest in
law to give ethnographic attention to the character and work of legal theory,
as produced in acts of teaching and writing, much as ethnographers of economics and science have done for those fields (Biagioli 2004; Pickering 1997;
cf. Crook, n.d.). Michel Callon, for example, has challenged economic sociologists, whose project has long been to debunk the primacy of economic
theory by showing that markets are ‘embedded in social relations’, to see that
economic theory is itself an ‘actant’, and a powerful one, such that markets
can be understood as ‘embedded in economics’ (Callon 1998: 23) From this
point of view, economic theory must become its own sociological object, not
simply a target of oppositional analysis. I want to suggest in a parallel way that
the character of legal knowledge, and the problem of description and analysis that legal knowledge practices pose for anthropological knowledge, should
be a central concern for the anthropology of law. The premise of my
ethnographic description is that property is a legal theory, and hence must be
understood in terms of lawyers’ particular practices of theory-making. The
ethnographic subjects of this article are legal theorists and their artefacts, that
is, what they term ‘legal doctrine’.2
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I hope to show that an ethnographic study of legal knowledge about property brings into view a particular form: for legal knowledge experts, property
has long been a device or tool – a means to an end – and one which can
be honed by importing other analytical tools from other disciplines.3 And yet
what kind of tool property should be, and what ends it should serve, remains
a matter of far more contention than anthropologists might assume. Whereas,
since the early twentieth century, American lawyers have understood property
primarily as a tool of state regulation in the interest of social welfare, the new
legal theorists of property seek to redefine property as a conservative bulwark
against state regulation, an anti-regulatory tool. My aim will be not so much
to address theoretical misunderstandings between anthropologists and lawyers
on this point as to treat these misunderstandings as facts demanding of ethnographic description and analysis. Rather than turn ethnography into a tool for
intervention in legal debates, therefore, I want to pursue ethnography as its
own form of engagement with legal theory. My objective is to take the unarticulated differences between disciplinary understandings of property as the
starting premise for an ethnography of legal theory. More specifically, I want
to hold on to the difference between a found object and a theoretical tool
long enough to provide an ethnographic account of lawyers’ theoretical enterprise itself.
To produce such an ethnographic account will require a different way of
conceptualizing the relationship between law and anthropology as disciplines.
More specifically, I will have to work at defining a difference between anthropology and law as domains of knowledge that is more ethnographically defensible and analytically productive than the simple oppositions that pervade the
anthropology of property such as state-sanctioned versus informal ownership
practices, or elite versus non-elite perspectives on ownership, legal experts’
versus disputants’ perspectives, or singular versus pluralistic conceptions of law.
Hence one of the puzzles of this ethnography, ironically, will be to define and
describe the difference between anthropological and legal analyses of property in a way that makes the latter accessible as an ethnographic object in its
own right. And it is on these more general problems of ethnographic conceptualization and description that the anthropology of law now stands to
contribute most fundamentally to current anthropological practice and theory,
as it has so often done in the past.

From a failed lesson to a found object
Since 1996, I have been engaged in fieldwork in two principal sites of legal
knowledge production – among elite law school faculties in the United States,
on the one hand, and regulators of the global financial markets in Japan, on
the other. In the United States, my fieldwork has involved participant observation in the course of holding a series of teaching posts at American law
schools. Although I rarely publish for a legal audience, I have taught property
law and other foundational subjects, known as ‘doctrinal courses’, participated
actively in faculty governance, attended seminars, organized conferences, and
made friends with colleagues.4
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The material I present here was collected using one standard ethnographic
technique for gathering data about knowledge practices – the experience of
learning to perform those practices through disciplined repetition under the
supervision and critique of one’s informants (Battaglia 1990; Rosaldo 1980;
Tsing 1993; Weiner 1991). The practices in this case are articulations and
manipulations of property doctrine. For two years, I have taught property, a
first-year mandatory course, under the guidance of senior colleagues, and in
dialogue with other property scholars.
My first year of teaching this course entailed the familiar ethnographic
experience of awkwardly performing an activity that my informants master
with grace and ease. According to student course evaluations, many students
found my course ‘useless’, ‘pretentious’, and ‘too theoretical’. As one put it,
‘There was nothing taught in this course that will help me pass the bar exam’.
Another wrote, ‘This is not a sociology course! I had to learn all the doctrine
on my own using a commercial outline!’5 The students had spent many long
and attentive hours in my class during which time they necessarily reflected
on the similarities and differences between my approach to law and that presented in other classes. Hence the conversation between myself and the students and the commentary this conversation elicited from colleagues, together
with dialogues with experts in property law and with property materials such
as cases, academic legal articles, and textbooks, constitutes a uniquely explicit
indigenous commentary on the proper ways of deploying legal knowledge
about property and the differences between legal knowledge and anthropological ways of knowing property (Holmes and Marcus n.d.).6
I framed my initial interest in property in rather conventional anthropological terms. Legal disputes over ownership seemed to be one site within
which questions of longstanding interest to anthropologists were being elaborated, such as the nature of personhood, the character of gifts and of exchange,
the meaning of social relations and of culture, and the impact of the market
and of technological innovation on these. Many anthropologists had begun to
treat legal opinions as found objects of their own, to be taken as evidence of
cultural currents. One standard case in the first-year property curriculum, John
Moore v. Regents of the University of California,7 for example, had already
attracted a considerable amount of anthropological attention. The plaintiff in
this California Supreme Court case was a patient whose spleen had been
removed in the course of consensual treatment. Unbeknownst to him, his cells
had unique properties that made them highly valuable for research, and the
doctors harvested those cells and turned them into a profitable patented cell
line. Mr Moore went to court to argue that his extracted spleen cells were
his property and hence, among other things, he was entitled to ownership
rights in the resulting cell line.
For anthropologists, the conflicting arguments in the case’s majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions seemed like accessible ethnographic objects
– cultural texts to be interpreted discursively for their cultural meanings. Paul
Rabinow wrote of his interest in the case, for example: ‘I want to chart the
forms of life-regulation and the production of value emergent today among
those we have authorized to speak the truth about life’ (1996: 131), and he
said that he had discerned in the case ‘broader cultural issues of the body and
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the person, ethics, economics, and science’ (1996: 130). It was an understandable approach to legal decisions from an anthropological point of view, but
one for which my informants were very soon to take me seriously to task.
My first attempt at teaching the Moore case focused on unpacking wider
political and cultural issues in precisely this way. I began with the interface
between property and personhood, raised questions about the way each is
defined in law in terms of the other, and then asked the students to describe
the difference that the law makes between persons and things. The question
struck the students as simplistic and naïve. Confused, I rephrased the problem
and asked what legal difference it would make to determine that certain
entities – human embryos, for example – were property. The students saw the
point, but found it fairly self-evident. Frustrated, I focused on Mr Moore and
the events that led to the case at hand, but once again the students found it
difficult, and ultimately not terribly interesting, to think about the scientific
details of spleens and cell lines. Sensing my control over the classroom slipping away, I turned to the arguments in the opinions and asked the students
which they found most convincing.When they had almost no response, I lectured for the remainder of the class about the genealogy of the arguments in
each of the opinions, cataloguing these as examples of differing traditions of
jurisprudence associated with different periods in recent American legal
history. Midway through the lecture, I noticed that the room had gone quiet.
The students had put down their pens and stopped typing on their laptops
on the assumption that what the professor was doing at that moment was
merely indulging in reflection on some personal fetish of her own, rather than
imparting important information which they should dutifully receive and
transcribe.
What I was doing in that failed lesson was standard practice in regard to
the anthropological handling of knowledge: I was treating the Moore case as
a found object to be elucidated by drawing relations among orders of phenomena and concepts (persons, social relations, legal rules, theories of property, theories of personhood). I took it for granted that revealing connections
across different domains (theories about property and American conceptions
of personhood, for example), and demonstrating that seemingly self-evident
categories like persons and property were in fact far more contested than they
seemed, would render the case interesting for my students. The first ethnographic lesson of this research was that I was wrong about this.
The problem, I came to understand, was with what my analysis both concealed and revealed. Over lunch, a senior colleague and renowned property
theorist sought to help me to improve. His advice was that the students would
not accept a ‘theoretical orientation’:
‘You have to slip the theory in: don’t give them academic articles to read – stick to the
cases. Don’t make the history the explicit subject of conversation. Teach the material, and
when one of them poses a problem, show them a solution. The solution could be
squibbed8 from [Author X’s] theory or could be a hypothetical from [Article Y] – but
you don’t need to tell them that.’

One of the most confusing critiques of my presentation was that it was
‘abstract’.The lesson described above, for example, began with body parts, and
with real persons, cast in familiar social roles – a doctor, a patient – all con-
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crete phenomena, and hence standard found objects from an anthropological
point of view. But the more concrete I thought I was making things, the more
my commentary seemed abstract and ‘theoretical’ to the students. As I reflected
on this mundane point of confusion, I came to identify a point of ethnographic entry into the difference between anthropologists’ and lawyers’ knowledge. My assumption that discussions of body parts and persons were
‘concrete’ ways of grounding one’s analysis simply did not hold. These were
not the appropriate found objects for a lawyer’s investigation of property
relations.
When my informants described my knowledge as abstract, they meant that
it was too far removed from the particular object that they have in mind when
they use the term ‘legal doctrine’.9 Let me elucidate this idea of doctrine by
describing my far more successful experience of teaching the same case, a year
later. I began by asking a student to summarize the facts of the case. ‘The
plaintiff was a patient at the defendant’s hospital and had his cells removed’,
she said. I interrupted to ask, ‘What is the cause of action?’ I teased out of
her that there were two: a cause of action for conversion, and a cause of action
for lack of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty. ‘What does conversion mean?’ When she did not respond, I asked if anyone had looked up
the definition in Black’s law dictionary the night before. One student raised his
hand: ‘The wrongful interference with ownership rights of another over personal property’, he said, over the sound of the clicking of keys as the others
typed those words into their laptops. ‘OK. Let’s start with the property claim.
What rule of law is the plaintiff arguing for’, I asked the first student again.
She struggled to state the plaintiff ’s argument in terms of a rule of law, and
ultimately articulated a proposed rule: there should be a property interest in
one’s own body parts. With that rule in hand, we then turned to the lower
court decisions and rephrased those as conclusions as to the validity of that
rule.
We then turned to the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in the
decision of the Supreme Court of California that were printed, in abridged
form, in the students’ casebook. ‘What kinds of arguments does the majority
deploy to reach the conclusion that there is no property right in one’s body
parts?’ I asked the class. ‘Well, the court said that there was no precedent for
it’, one student answered. ‘What do they mean by that? Isn’t there a property
right in one’s persona?10 Isn’t that precedent? What is the difference between
persona and body parts such that the court can conclude that that doctrine
does not serve as precedent here?’ As the students identified successive arguments in the opinions, I asked them to contextualize those arguments in this
way in relation to other rules of property law that they had already learned,
or to think about the arguments’ consequences or applicability in other possible ‘fact patterns’ by proposing a series of ‘hypotheticals’: ‘Imagine that a
couple decides to freeze embryos produced through in-vitro fertilization. Later
on, the partners separate, and the former wife wishes to donate them to a
childless couple while a husband wishes to have them destroyed and claims
he has a property right in those embryos. Should the court recognize a property right?’ Here the students recognized that I was ‘squibbing’ another case
mentioned in their casebook, Davis v. Davis.11 I had reframed an actual case
as a hypothetical case, a tool for manipulating doctrine.
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As we approached the end of the hour, the arguments presented in the
majority decision in Moore now seemed legally contestable. At that point, I
asked, ‘What do you think is really motivating the court here?’ There was a
short pause, and then a student with a science background raised his hand
and said that it would be a disaster for scientific progress if people like Moore
could show up and claim ownership rights. He explained that cells taken from
a patient often pass through multiple hands – from the hospital, to an intermediary, to a research lab, to another research lab – and hence if the court
had found in Mr Moore’s favour, in the future, someone down the line could
suddenly be held financially responsible for an extraction of cells in which
they played no part and this would have a ‘chilling effect’ on scientific research.
Facts about the practice of science that, in my first teaching of the course,
had seemed dull and unimportant now, emerging in this way from the gaps
in the doctrine, struck the students as highly prescient. They concluded that
the real basis of the decision was the court’s pragmatic commitment to creating the legal conditions for scientific progress.
In this short example of how doctrine was made visible, manipulated, and
ultimately backgrounded in property knowledge, we can see what was wrong
with my initial anthropological reading of Moore from a legal point of view:
I had the wrong found object. It was doctrine that needed to emerge from
the cases, not relations of ownership and their meanings. Doctrine in this
understanding is the artefact of the accumulation of individual cases. The
Moore decision on its own is simply a judicial decision; but when set in analytical context by understanding the similarities and differences between the
issues in Moore and the decision in Davis on property rights in human
embryos, or the decisions involving property rights in one’s persona, it
becomes part of a ‘doctrine’ of property rights in one’s person. Hence
doctrine is the outcome of analysis performed at the bench, and also in the
classroom, and in every law office. In her own ethnography of American legal
pedagogy, the linguistic anthropologist Elizabeth Mertz argues that American
legal education is a process of unlearning certain orientations to texts from
the social sciences and humanities that students have learned in their first
degree courses12 and of learning a different, more pragmatic orientation
‘focused upon the way in which legal texts index their contexts of production and use’ (Mertz 1996: 233):
[E]ven were all the technical language to be transformed somehow into more accessible
language, the ‘meaning’ for which lawyers read the text would remain elusive to those
reading for referential content. A legal reading of case law focuses rather on the metapragmatic structure of the text, in which lies the key to its authority. This metapragmatic
structure is (at least) twofold, indexing both the context of prior cases in the textual tradition now reanimated as precedent for this particular case, and the interactional context
of this particular case in its prior transformations … (Mertz 1996: 235-6).

Mertz’s focus on the difference between referential and metapragmatic readings points to the problem that legal cases pose for anthropologists who might
read them as cultural artefacts. For example, one crucial analytical device in
this process of using the Moore case as a source of doctrine was the hypothetical. Hypotheticals allowed the class to knit cases into doctrine, but they
also highlighted the social problems that were at stake in these decisions, such
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as the effect of new reproductive technologies on the emergence of new kinds
of property claims. The hypothetical encouraged students to begin to think
of the decisions of judges as legal means to social ends. And yet the cartoonlike description of social phenomena that is the hallmark of the hypothetical
is likely to offend anthropologists’ descriptive sensibilities. The hypothetical in
this exercise was a tool, a means of solving a doctrinal problem. But this means
was also fashioned from other endpoints of doctrinal analysis, namely legal
decisions. In much the same way, my colleague was advising me to treat what
he termed ‘theory’ as a tool by squibbing it. The facts presented in the hypothetical were carefully tailored to present an analytical puzzle and hence were
already prefigured by the doctrine itself (Parker 2003). We can see from these
examples that doctrinal analysis aims not to describe the social world as ethnographic descriptions do, but rather to solve social problems.
Just because the social world is not described in legal knowledge does not
mean that doctrine is removed from the social world in the lawyer’s conception. The same social facts that provided the point of departure for anthropological interest in the Moore case, such as the impact of new scientific
discoveries on concepts of ownership, were also of great interest to lawyers,
so long as these facts were made to emerge as the artefacts of doctrinal analysis, as contextualized in doctrine. The emergence of facts about the economic
and scientific consequences of legal decisions as interesting and relevant in
turn reframed doctrinal analysis as important not as an end in itself, but as a
means to other economic and social ends. The students were learning not
simply to manipulate doctrine, but to see doctrine as a technology, and to ask
how well this particular tool functions relative to the social, political, and economic ends it is formulated to serve. The focus of legal analysis of property
begins with doctrinal categories but concludes with ‘what works’ (Ackerman
1977). The social world beyond the law is relevant, in other words, but in a
specific way. It is the end, and the law is the means.
Doctrine turns out to be a complicated artefact, then – internally composed of many other artefacts and analytical relations so that the ends of analysis, such as a legal decision, could be recast as the means of another, such as
a hypothetical, and indeed the entire project of doctrine could in the final
analysis be recast as a means to some other social end. Put into practice as a
way of performing legal knowledge, this legal means-ends relation consists of
a nesting, cascading set of relations of means to ends. Acts of regulation are
means to social ends; the decisions of judges in property cases about the scope
of those acts, likewise, are means to particular ends; and scholarly thinking
about judicial decision-making constitutes further means to ends. The law is
simply the aggregation of each of these knowledge practices: in lawyers’ conception, the law is a nested set of means and ends, and these are concretized
in institutions that themselves are means to other ends. This understanding
was put into practice pragmatically in the pedagogy of the classroom.The task
of the student was to link individual decisions and hypotheticals into a coherent doctrine. The cases they encountered were squibbed in the textbook,
turned into rules by commercial publishers, cited and recited by courts as, in
each case, one set of ends became another’s means. The lesson was that doctrine was nothing but a chain of cases and arguments about those cases in
which the ends of one analytical practice become the means of the next. As
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such, the practice of legal knowledge is linked to social reality, not of a different order from it in the way that anthropologists might understand their
own description to be something of a different order from the phenomena it
describes.
In the remainder of this article, I will use the term ‘analytic’ to refer to the
means-ends relation that organizes doctrine in this way – independent of its
specific content (what means) or potential uses (what ends). I use this term
as a place-holder that does not prefigure a conclusion about whether meansends relations actually are theories, rules, ideologies, practices, or institutions.
Means-ends thus emerge as the proper found object for an ethnography of
property. It now remains to consider what form an anthropological analysis
of this ethnographic object might take.

Disciplinary means and ends
The conventions of anthropological analysis usually demand that the ethnographic object be described in terms of a context of one kind or another. As
it turns out, legal theorists specializing in property have much to say about
the context of the means-ends analytic. An ethnographer’s question often provokes a deluge of enthusiastic, if somewhat didactic, discourse about history
– and, specifically, about the birth of modernism in American law. This story,
repeated with slight variations and amplifications in countless law review articles and monographs, can be briefly summarized as follows.
In the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the
twentieth century, a new notion of property captured the imagination of
American judges and legal theorists. This new understanding held that, rather
than being an artefact of changing custom, property was a natural and prepolitical fact and also the fundamental building block of a liberal political
order (Alexander 1997). The corollary to this was that no legislature had the
authority to interfere with citizens’ property rights, and judges had no choice
but to strike down any laws which contravened such rights. As it was deployed
by ‘formalist’ judges, as they came to be known, the concept of property
was abstract and analytically expansive – it was capable of encompassing the
ownership of land and other possessions, but also other kinds of powers and
entitlements, such as the entitlements of employers to enter into agreements
with their employees at a time when there were calls to place limits on the
terms of such agreements through minimum wage and worker safety laws.
At almost the same time that it emerged in judicial opinions and scholarly
writings, however, this formalist notion of property came under vigorous
attack. The critics, who were known as Legal Realists because they claimed
to focus on the ‘reality’ of ‘law in action’ rather than what they termed ‘law
in books’ (Pound 1910), challenged what they viewed as the ‘unscientific’
claims of formalist scholars and judges about the autonomy and logical coherence of property and the duty of the judge simply to ‘apply’ the law regardless of the social consequences. In this critique, the Realists, borrowing from
philosophical pragmatism (e.g. Dewey 1941: 31; cf. Parker 2003; West 1989:
5), viewed knowledge as a tool with practical uses and consequences, and
reimagined property as an instrument of political interests (e.g. Cohen 1927;
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Hale 1923; cf. Atiyah & Summers 1987: 252-5). For Karl Llewellyn, one of
Realism’s principal theorists and a great enthusiast for anthropology, Realism
demanded a ‘conception of law as means to social ends and not as an end in
itself; so that any part needs constantly to be examined for its purpose, and
for its effect, and to be judged in the light of both and their relation to each
other’ (1931: 1236).
Drawing on a familiar modernist trope, the Realists cast this tool as a technical machine, and the lawyer as technoscientist (Summers 1982: 194). The
chaotic, continually changing nature of social ends could be accommodated
and even embraced by a highly rationalized, technical means-ends framework
that would calibrate the law according to changing social conditions. To its
proponents, this problem-solving modality, and accompanying engineering
mentality (Winner 1977: 11), conceptualized Realism as something that was
more legitimate than political critique and more practical than philosophical
contemplation. A century later, this is a theoretical battle that is largely over:
in the United States, it is difficult to find a lawyer who is not an instrumentalist and a pragmatist in this technoscientific and sociologically informed
sense.
This is the context my informants would wish me to highlight. I want to
add that this sociological critique of formalism also created a demand for
anthropological and sociological studies. The Realists embraced anthropology
as a body of knowledge that was valuable for the purpose of understanding
how law functioned in society – as an instrument for understanding legal
instruments. Llewellyn’s collaborative study of the Cheyenne with E. Adamson
Hoebel, for example, aimed to understand the functions of legal processes
through an empirical analysis of disputes (Llewellyn & Hoebel 1941: 230).
The Realist judge and scholar Jerome Frank likewise drew extensively on
Malinowski in his psychoanalytic critique of legal formalism (Frank 1930).
And in fact, early and mid-twentieth-century anthropologists also regarded
law as a tool to be used in resolving disputes (Malinowski 1984 [1926]),
curbing violence (Bohannan 1967), or cleansing society of dysfunction
(Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 214) – in other words, a tool of social control (Hoebel
1954: 275, citing Llewellyn). Borrowing from anthropology through a legal
lens, it was possible for Realist scholars and judges to see all social realities as
simply the aggregate of individual instrumental acts, as a chain, or cascading
set of means-ends relations that included the law (cf. Riles 2004c). Well into
the twentieth century, this shared understanding of law as instrument provided
the premise for anthropologists’ borrowings from legal theory and vice versa.
Jack Goody’s extensive discussion of the work of Wesley Hohfeld (1913;
1917), a canonical figure in modernist property theory, focuses on property
as a means by which persons may do something relative to other persons
(Goody 1962: 287). Simon Roberts summarizes this interdisciplinary conversation with the claim that Bronislaw Malinowski’s insistence that ‘law ought
to be defined by function and not by form’ is essentially ‘the same approach’
as the American Realist concern ‘with what law does rather than what it is’
(Roberts 1979: 28). In other words, the history that lawyers invoke as context
is a history which they share with anthropologists.
Yet it is not simply a history that is shared. What defines modernist
legal knowledge from the lawyer’s point of view is its contextualized form of
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analysis, and this analysis is contextualized using tools that anthropologists
typically claim as their own. As with anthropologists of the same period, the
Realists traded one set of abstractions and methods – legal categories – for
another – social relations – in order to reframe debates about property around
instrumental, functional concerns. The key analytical category of Realism was
none other than the Social: in the Realist ideology, law was at its core a means
to wider social ends. In this formulation, legal means and social ends were
clearly distinguishable but also relationally defined. Hence the Realist understanding of law as a tool partook in an aesthetic of relationality that was central
to twentieth-century anthropological knowledge (Strathern 1995) – an aesthetic that Goodwin and Duranti term ‘context’.13
There is increasing ethnographic evidence that this intermingling of legal
and anthropological knowledge practices is not simply an historical context
for contemporary legal anthropology, but is one of its pervasive methodological problems. John Borneman draws on the work of Sally Falk Moore
to argue that ‘political and economic context is not external to the law
but itself part of a cultural form to which law gives a certain expression’
(Borneman 1997: 18). Bill Maurer describes the process of assembling files of
letters of reference as required under ‘due diligence’ laws that regulate who
can conduct business in the British Virgin Islands as practices that ‘share a singular form’ with academic personnel reviews (2004: 3). Kim Fortun’s ethnography of the legal settlement of the Bhopal environmental disaster case and
its aftermath begins with the fact that her ethnographic object ‘is not a unit
of analysis’ (2001: 14). A recent collection of papers written by lawyers and
anthropologists flags a number of shared artefacts of legal and anthropological knowledge such as potentiality, actuality, and creativity (Pottage & Mundy
2004).
Recent appropriations of anthropological arguments by legal theorists of
property present further evidence of this phenomenon. At first blush, what
is jarring about some legal theorists’ current readings of anthropological
evidence is that these bolster a claim that most anthropologists would steadfastly reject. These scholars reinterpret anthropological accounts of other
peoples’ narratives of ownership and debt as cross-cultural evidence that neoliberal conceptions of property rights reflect a natural human orientation
towards ownership because, functionally or culturally speaking, everyone has
it (Bailey 1992). Or they deploy narrative and cultural theory to cast the
Realist conception of socially defined and analytically divisible bundles of
property rights as a pedantic technicality that is out of step with ordinary
people’s much more absolute and objectified understandings of ownership
(Rose 1994). In this way, these theorists suggest that individualized property
rights are pre-political, and that it is rather collective ownership, and, by extension, the idea of redistributing private wealth through social justice legislation,
that is both inefficient and unnatural, a product of well-intentioned but misguided social engineers.14
Anthropologists may be equally perplexed, however, by these theorists’
wilful ignorance of the political and theoretical divide that many anthropologists would posit between legal and anthropological conceptions of property.
Legal theorists’ instrumentalization of anthropological theory and data is
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premised on the assumption that anthropological analysis is not something
outside of the technical legal object, as many anthropologists would like to
imagine; rather, it assumes that anthropology has long been the very means
of the technical.
The political end of these legal theorists’ intervention in property debates
is to replace the modernist legal conception of property as a contingent,
manipulable, and hence always already politicized chain of relations of means
and ends with a more absolute, immutable understanding of property rights.
For them, the goal is precisely to turn property into a found object. What
exactly is the appeal of anthropology for these theorists, then? Over the course
of many conversations and seminars, I have come to understand that from
the standpoint of a modernist conception of property as technical relations of
means and ends, anthropological accounts seem to present straightforward
descriptions of found objects – accounts of property relations in this or that
(often exotic) locale. Hence the invocation of ethnographic accounts of others’
property rights emerges as a means of foregrounding found objects and backgrounding political and analytical relations. For anthropologists, of course, the
found object of the ethnographic account is always only an analytic, a vehicle
for the kind of relational, politicized analysis these neo-liberal property theorists wish to disavow.Yet these theorists read description as the end of ethnography, and refashion it as a means of their own – an instrument for displacing
Realist conceptions of property which they view as already too imbued with
social and political analysis.
In the new property theory, therefore, the ends of anthropological knowledge have been turned into the means of a legal defence of neo-liberal property rights. One possible response to this appropriation of anthropological
knowledge would be to seek to correct the ethnographic record. The uses of
anthropological data in contemporary legal texts would seem to be so amateuristic15 (Demsetz 1967; Soto 2000) that at first glance what would seem to
be called for is a straightforward primer in the anthropology of property.
Indeed, turning our theories into discursive tools in this way is precisely what
legal theorists would expect anthropologists to do. But it is now apparent
that to correct the errors in property theorists’ anthropological claims would
be merely to add another link to the chain of means and ends and hence
expand its reach. With the help of this ethnographic material, we can now
restate with more ethnographic specificity the nature of the intermingling of
knowledges observed by many anthropologists of law: property is best understood as a chain of relations of means and ends of anthropological and legal
knowledge, each recycling the ends of the other’s knowledge into means of
its own.
This rethinking of the target of anthropological research from an object
to be contextualized to a chain of means and ends draws upon a number of
current projects that seek to displace the form of object-context relations with
analytical and artefactual relations between the analyst and the object of analysis. For the actor-network theory of science and technology studies (Latour
1990), for example, the positivist distance between social scientific analysis and
its objects is replaced with a chain of artefacts – the anthropologist’s theories,
texts, and instruments, the subject’s theories, texts, and instruments, each
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manipulable into ever further forms of one another (cf. Pottage 2004). The
premise of contemporary linguistic anthropology, likewise, is a recognition that
language practices can be studied only through other language practices, and
hence that it is necessary to treat the anthropologist’s linguistic and textual
practices, and those of the informant, as temporally and socially situated in a
singular, telescoped field (Silverstein & Urban 1996).
But to posit the target of anthropological research in these terms is to
foreground the problems that legal knowledge poses for ethnographic study:
an ethnographic object should have an aura of difference about it, that is, it
should be demanding of, and be lacking in, analysis. This is what typically
renders the ethnographic object anthropologically interesting (Riles 2004b).
Yet legal knowledge about property presents itself as already self-analysed.
For example, I mentioned at the outset that anthropologists have tended
to read legal cases as if their meaning were transparently accessible, rather
than as artefacts to be understood ethnographically. There is plenty of
fodder for such a textualist analysis in the cases themselves. In his dissent in
the Moore opinion, for example, Justice Mosk describes property in terms
that can almost be imagined to lay a trap for the ethnographer in their very
familiarity:
Being broad, the concept of property is also abstract: rather than referring directly to a
material object such as a parcel of land or the tractor that cultivates it, the concept of
property is often said to refer to a ‘bundle of rights’ that may be exercised with respect
to that object – principally the rights to possess the property, to use the property, to
exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by sale or by gift.16

To anthropologists with an interest in property relations, therefore, the
ethnographic discovery that lawyers understand property as a means to an end
may seem as unremarkable as it does to lawyers themselves because the
means-ends relation is as much an anthropological analytic as a legal one.
Anthropologists documenting the pervasiveness of contemporary invocations
of property discourse have recently sought to show how property ‘instrumentalizes’ given cultural categories, for example, or how property serves as
a tool of certain interests at the expense of others. The counterintuitive
problem for the ethnography of law is that legal knowledge is simply too
familiar to be ‘heard’ as an ethnographic subject (Riles 2004a).
Marilyn Strathern has recently described ethnography in already familiar
knowledge practices as a project of seeking out an epistemological counterpart to traditional anthropological practices of contextualization: ‘Whether its
content is bounded or dispersed, a context sets the epistemological boundaries … That is where the “discipline” in such work lies’ (2004: 37). What
would set the epistemological boundaries for an ethnography of means-ends
relations in this sense? I mentioned at the outset that one of the tasks of
this ethnography would be to define and describe a meaningful difference
between lawyers’ manipulation of means and ends and those of anthropological analyses such that legal knowledge about property rights could come
into view as an ethnographic subject of its own. Such a difference must be
defined from within the epistemological boundaries of the analytic, meansends relations.
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Means-ends reversals
The character of relations of means to ends was in fact a longstanding
twentieth-century philosophical problem. The premise of philosophical pragmatism was that knowledge should be viewed as a means to an end, and
nothing more. What was effective was what was true ( James 2000: 194). And
yet how were the political or social ends to be defined in such an antifoundationalist tradition? In a series of essays that deeply influenced the
Realists, John Dewey reversed the analytical directionality of instrumentalism
to argue that such ends should be defined through a process of thinking
through the means, that is, by thinking about what was possible with the tools
available (Dewey 1998a). One ‘starts in the middle’, he argued, and discovers
the ends of knowledge by reasoning through the means (Dewey 1998b).
In a parallel way, I want to suggest that if anthropologists and legal theorists are working within a singular vocabulary of objects and analytical or
political relations, the difference is that they are working the device in reverse.
For anthropologists, property as a found object in the first instance is shown,
through analysis, to be a tool of political and social interests. For neo-liberal
legal theorists, in contrast, what is at first glimpse clearly a tool of political
interests can be seen, with the help of ethnographic data, to be merely a found
object in the world, ordinary people’s common-sense commitment to ‘their
property’. Like partners on a see-saw, anthropologists and lawyers are operating the same device in countervailing, albeit mutually enabling, ways. At each
stage, the appropriations of the ends of one disciplinary knowledge as the
means of the other consist in practices of reversal. It is this means-ends reversal that constitutes the disciplinary difference and hence sets the epistemological boundaries for an ethnography of property.
What is significant about Dewey’s own reversal, from this perspective, is that
it foregrounds the means of knowledge, not the ends, even as Dewey’s philosophical project is premised on a faithful adherence to the question of what
knowledge is for. In his essay on technology, likewise, Martin Heidegger distances himself from the ‘instrumental’ definition of technology as merely a
means to an end and claims instead that the essence of technology is the
means, best understood as a ‘way of revealing’ (1977: 12). Heidegger’s description of the technical as a knowledge practice – revealing – which is not an
end in itself, but which nevertheless foregrounds its own means, also finds
contemporary echoes in the work of Giorgio Agamben, who defines politics
not as a debate over ends, but as ‘the sphere of pure means’ (2000: 60). Commenting on Aristotle’s distinction between production (poesis) and action
(praxis) in which the former has an end other than itself while the latter is
an end in itself, he focuses on a third category, the gesture:
[I]f producing is a means in view of an end and praxis is an end without means, the
gesture then breaks with the false alternative between ends and means that paralyzes
morality and presents instead means that, as such, evade the orbit of mediality without
becoming, for this reason, ends … The gesture is the exhibition of a mediality: it is the
process of making a means visible as such (Agamben 2000: 57-8, emphasis removed).

Dewey, Heidegger, and Agamben, each in their own fashion, recast debates
about instrumental politics in ways that offer a more subtle understanding of
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the character of the means itself. Each shares an appreciation of the fact that
political analysis and critique must begin from within the epistemological
boundaries of the instrument – that solutions must be found in the means of
technology. Agamben’s formulation of politics as gesture and Heidegger’s view
of technology as a ‘way of revealing’, as well as Dewey’s reversal of the directionality of means-ends relations, highlight one important effect of meansends reversal: what is foregrounded are the means.
This helps to capture a subtle but fundamental difference between the
instrumentalism that anthropological studies of property impute to the object
where they ask questions about whose interests property serves, or how the
introduction of property relations changes social practices, and lawyers’ own
valuation of legal means. The ethnographic experience of training lawyers in
the uses of their tools has taught me that lawyers value their knowledge in a
particular way – not simply as a means to an end, or an end in itself, but as
pure problem-solving means, as technical instruments. In the telescoped chains
of means-ends reversals that constitute property doctrine, what is foregrounded
are the means of its manipulation and use. What defines legal knowledge is
precisely this commitment to the analytic, the means as means, despite the
fact that this analytic is explained and defined by practitioners as a question
of ends, that is to say, a question of what doctrines are for.
Of course, anthropologists of property may respond that their interest is not
in describing lawyers’ own conceptions of their instruments, but rather in
exposing their instrumental effects. My ethnographic focus on the means, from
this perspective, may seem to obscure property’s ends. I only want to point
out that this view exemplifies the character of property knowledge which I
have sought to describe. Anthropologists who assert that property should be
analysed only for its political ends are seeking to create a distance between
anthropological and legal knowledge by reversing the directionality of legal
means and ends and hence foregrounding their own anthropological means
(lawyers may value the means, but anthropologists focus on the ends). These
anthropologists are not describing property so much as turning legal means
into means of their own. Anthropologists who assert that their interest is not
in describing legal knowledge but in providing a critique of its effects are
demonstrating, in other words, that means can only be turned into further
means (cf. Miyazaki 2004).
From this perspective, there is perhaps a reason why the anthropology of
law has long been the site of important and passionate debates about ethnographic method (Bohannan 1967; Gluckman 1965; Moore 1969; Nader 1972).
In taking means-ends reversals as the epistemological boundaries for the anthropology of property, I am proposing that anthropologists once again take up the
means of ethnography as the central project of the anthropology of law.

NOTES
I owe special thanks to Hiro Miyazaki and Amy Levine for their help with earlier drafts,
and also to the members of our transatlantic reading group,Tom Boellstorff,Tony Crook, Stefan
Helmreich, Iris Jean-Klein, Bill Maurer, Hiro Miyazaki, and Adam Reed, for their spirited criticism. For comments and suggestions of many kinds, I thank Bruce Ackerman, Gregory Alexan-
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der, Robert Burns, Jae Chung, Doug Holmes, Kunal Parker, Laura Nader, Anna Tsing, and two
anonymous JRAI readers. Earlier versions were presented at workshops in the Department of
Cultural Anthropology, Stanford University, the Department of Anthropology, University of
California at Santa Cruz, the Property, Transactions, and Creations conference held at the
University of Cambridge, the Pragmatism, Law, and Governmentality conference held at
Cornell University, and at the ‘Anthropology of Hopeful Moments’ session at the American
Anthropological Association meetings in 2003.
1
There is a considerable body of ethnographic work on legal language, however (e.g. Conley
& O’Barr 1998; Hirsch 1998; Philips 1998), as well as on the perspectives of ordinary ‘litigants’
on legal practices (e.g. Greenhouse 1986; Merry 1990; Yngvesson 1993), and anthropologists
have also made important contributions in introducing Euro-American audiences to debates in
Islamic jurisprudence largely ignored by comparative lawyers (e.g. Mundy 2004; Rosen 1989).
Legal knowledge itself has recently been studied ethnographically by a number of science studies
scholars (e.g. Latour 2004; Valverde 2003).
2
Fieldwork has focused my attention on the way lawyers regularly treat documents, theories, persons, and institutions as actants of a singular order (Latour 1990; Lynch 1993). I will
represent them as such here.
3
Unless otherwise noted, my discussion is limited to American legal theory and practice. All
references to ‘legal knowledge experts’, ‘legal theorists’ or ‘legal practitioners’ therefore should
be interpreted as references to American legal theorists and practitioners.
4
This article is limited to the United States portion of my fieldwork. For discussions of the
Japanese portion, see Riles 2004a and Riles n.d.
5
The student refers here to ‘outlines’ produced by commercial publishers as study aids for
law students. These outlines summarize the ‘doctrine’ and tutor the student in how to apply it
on a so-called ‘issue-spotter’ examination – an examination in which students are presented
with a hypothetical fact pattern and are expected to spot the relevant legal issues and analyze
them in terms of the doctrine. For an example, see Dukeminier (2002).
6
Douglas Holmes and George Marcus (forthcoming) have recently suggested that the
challenge of contemporary ethnography ‘involves the delineation of the phenomenon to be
studied’, a challenge best met through attention to ‘shared frameworks of analysis’ between
anthropologists and their subjects-collaborators:
[C]ontemporary critical ethnography orients itself through the imaginaries of expert
others – through what we call para-ethnography … This is distinctly not about an
ethnography of elite cultures, but rather an access to a construction of an imaginary for
fieldwork that can only be shaped by alliances with makers of visionary knowledge who
are already in the scene or within the bounds of the field (references omitted).
In my second year of teaching Property Law, I structured the course so as to generate data on
this question. I hired one of the students who excelled in the course in the first year as a
‘teaching assistant’ with the responsibility to attend class each day, meet individually with students, and provide me with weekly feedback on my presentation of the material and students’
reactions as well as his own. Two questions on the final examination, including in particular an
essay question asking the students to discuss several cases in light of the quotation from Kelsen
that serves as the first epigraph to this article, provided insight into individual reactions. I also
consulted extensively with other property scholars and other law teachers about the themes in
this article (and I particularly thank Professor Kunal Parker of Cleveland Marshall College of
Law).
7
51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990).
8
‘Squibbing’ is the standard practice of excerpting, summarizing, or restating the facts of a
case or the point of an academic article so as to render these relevant to another analytical
problem. In law school textbooks, numerous actual cases are ‘squibbed’ – summarized in a paragraph or more, often as hypothetical facts or patterns that pose questions for the students to
answer and without attribution or citation.
9
Black’s law dictionary defines doctrine simply as ‘a rule, principle, theory, or tenet of the law;
as, e.g. Abstention doctrine; Clean hands doctrine, etc.’ (Black 1990: 481).
10
The pages preceding the Moore case in the students’ textbook had focused on ‘property
in one’s persona’, or the ‘right of publicity’, a property law doctrine that gives celebrities a
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property interest in their image, likeness, or identity and hence a cause of action against persons
who imitate them without their permission (Dukeminier & Krier 2002: 77-9).
11
842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
12
In the United States, legal education can be pursued only as a second degree. Hence all
students hold a first degree in another discipline.
13
‘A relationship between two orders of phenomena that mutually inform each other to
comprise a larger whole is absolutely central to the notion of context’ (Goodwin & Duranti
1992: 4). If, in Goodwin and Duranti’s terms, an ethnographic object and its context exist in
a kind of relationship of figure to ground (1992: 9), here, the figure already contains within
itself its own relationship of figure to ground. I use the term ‘aesthetic’ in Marilyn Strathern’s
sense of ‘the persuasiveness of form, the elicitation of a sense of appropriateness’ (1991: 10),
rather than in the Kantian sense of notions of beauty prevalent in the anthropology of art. I
have discussed this category at greater length in Riles (2000).
14
Although this line of argument represents the majority position in the legal academy, other
property scholars borrow from anthropological arguments to very different purposes. Some
diverse examples include the work of Bruce Ackerman (1977), Rosemary Coombe (1998), and
Paul Kahn (1999).
15
I mean this as an ethnographic description and not as a critique of legal knowledge. I have
elaborated on the efficacy of the aesthetics of amateurism in legal knowledge in another context
(Riles 2001).
16
51 Cal. 3d 120, 105-06 (1990) (Mosk, dissenting).
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De la propriété comme connaissance juridique :
moyens et fins
Résumé
Dans le cadre du regain d’intérêt que connaît la thérorie de la propriété en anthropologie,
l’auteur s’intéresse à l’élaboration des théories juridiques en tant qu’objet à part entière de
l’ethnographie. Elle aborde notamment une construction spécifique, l’instrument, ou le
rapport entre les moyens et les fins, qui est le moteur des théories juridiques et anthropologiques sur la propriété. L’analyse du fonctionnement de cette construction amène à la
conclusion qu’au lieu de disséquer les fins du savoir juridique, l’anthropologie de la propriété devrait se consacrer à l’élaboration de ses propres moyens.
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